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I COMMENTS]
The Child Support Recovery Act Of
1992-Is The Federal Government's
Involvement In The Criminal Enforcement
Of Child Support At An End After United
States v. Lopez?
I. Introduction
For five years, three children in New York have been awaiting
the receipt of child support payments from their father, Jeffrey A.
Nichols.' Mr. Nichols, a prominent investment advisor, abandoned
his wife and children and was ordered to pay nine thousand dollars
per month in child support.2 Mr. Nichols subsequently moved
from New York and traversed through Florida, Vermont, and
Canada to avoid his child support obligations.3 In Florida, he
attempted to shirk his responsibility to his children by denying that
he was their father.' In Vermont, Mr. Nichols implemented yet
other tactics to avoid payment, such as having his clients wire
payments to his second wife's bank account rather than his own
1. James C. McKinley Jr., Investment Advisor Jailed in Child Support Case, N.Y.





and hiding money in a bank account in the British Virgin Islands.5
Mr. Nichols' reason for nonpayment was not the inability to pay his
child support responsibilities.6 Rather, his non-payment was an
intentional decision to abandon his children financially.
Each state-New York, Vermont, and Florida-attempted to
force Mr. Nichols to pay.7 However, state officials lacked author-
ity to have him arrested in other states, and thus were unsuccessful
in enforcing the child support order.8 Finally, the federal govern-
ment charged Mr. Nichols9 with the crime of willful failure to pay
a past-due child support obligation under the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA" or "Act").' ° After five years of
waiting, the children will receive their child support payments."
Unfortunately, the outstanding child support obligation now totals
over $580,000.12
The above situation illustrates the benefit that the federal
government can provide to the enforcement of child support
payments through its unique ability to enforce interstate cases. In
many interstate support cases, states are not equipped to enforce
child support orders, especially when a parent flees a state to avoid
making payments. 3 When the non-custodial parent fails to pay
support, the financial responsibility of providing for dependent
5. Id.
6. For instance, in Vermont Mr. Nichols could afford to buy a $500,000 home.
McKinley, supra note 1, at B1. He was president of his own company. Id. Also, he earned
$180,000 during 1994. Justice Ready to Save "Deadbeat Parent" Law, CHARLESTON
GAZErTE, Aug. 29, 1995, at B6.
7. Justice Ready, supra note 6, at B6.
8. Id
9. McKinley, supra note 1, at B1. Mr. Nichols was charged by Criminal Information
for violating the CSRA. United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
He moved to dismiss the Information on the grounds that the Act exceeded Congress'
Commerce Clause authority, violated the Tenth Amendment and the principles of federalism
and comity, was void for vagueness, and violated the Equal Protection Clause by promoting
selective prosecution of males. Id. The district court found the CSRA to be constitutional,
thereby denying Mr. Nichols' motion to dismiss. Id
10. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994) (hereinafter "CSRA" or "the Act"). The CSRA also amends
the following: 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3711 etseq. (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796cc,
3796cc-I, 3796cc-2, 3796cc-3, 3796cc-4, 3796cc-5, 3796cc-6 (1994) (regarding distribution of
funds); 42 U.S.C. § 3793 (1994); and 42 U.S.C. § 12301 (1994) (establishing the Commission
on Child and Family Welfare).
11. McKinley, supra note 1, at B1.
12. "It's a shame that a case has to reach this magnitude before it gets legal attention."
McKinley, supra note 1, at B1 (quoting Mrs. Nichols-Kane, the children's mother).
13. Albert Momjian, Dealing With Child Support Delinquents, FAM. LAW WKLY., May
9, 1994, at 6.
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children falls upon taxpayers and state welfare rolls, rather than on
parents. 4 The Child Support Recovery Act's foundation is the
belief that a child's expectations of support from the non-custodial
parent "should not end at the state line."' 5
Despite the advantages the federal government provides in
cases such as Mr. Nichols and his children, Congress may have
exceeded its constitutional limits when it passed the CSRA.
t6
Congress passed the CSRA in 1992 to impose criminal sanctions
upon persons who willfully fail to pay outstanding child support
obligations where the child resides out-of-state. 7 The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona first held the Act
to be unconstitutional in companion cases.'8 The Arizona District
14. H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Statement on the Signing the Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992, 28 PUB. PAPERS 2122 (Oct. 25, 1992).
15. H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 228. As illustrated by the Nichols case, the CSRA has been challenged
on several different grounds, including: (1) Exceeding the authority given to Congress
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See, United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D.
Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360
(D. Ariz. 1995) and United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95
F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), affid, 92
F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093 (D.R.I. 1996); United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F.
Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1996);
United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Sims, 936 F.
Supp. 817 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1996);
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (vacating on the ground of venue). (2) Violating the Tenth Amendment and the
principles of federalism and comity. See, Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330, 95 F.3d at 1004;
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 368, 95 F.3d at 791; Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 92, 92 F.3d at 107;
Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1101-02 (thoroughly discussing the Tenth Amendment issue);
Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1083; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315, 316; Collins, 921 F. Supp. at
1034; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 915; Sims, 936 F. Supp. at 820. (3) Void for vagueness. See,
Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 93; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 317; (4) Violating the Equal Protection
Clause. See, Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331; Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1106-09; Nichols, 928
F. Supp. at 318. Collins, 921 F. Supp. at 1032; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393. This Comment
will focus on the Commerce Clause issue and also will discuss briefly the issues of federalism
and comity and the Tenth Amendment. The other challenges to the CSRA are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a).
18. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360; Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360. Since Schroeder and
Mussari are companion cases, this author will cite only to Schroeder throughout this
Comment. Recently, these decisions were reversed by the Ninth Circuit. United States v.
Schroeder v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the district court's arguments
are essential to the analysis of the CSRA's constitutionality and will be discussed in Section
IV, infra.
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Court based its decisions upon United States v. Lopez,19 the
United States Supreme Court's recent opinion that limited
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.' ° The district
court held that the CSRA does not substantially affect interstate
commerce; therefore, the Act exceeded Congressional "constitu-
tional authority.",21 Since Judge Rosenblatt's decisions, two other
district courts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
Western District of Texas, also have held the CSRA to be
unconstitutional.22
This Comment argues that the CSRA is constitutional even
after United States v. Lopez. Although the CSRA has been held
unconstitutional by several district courts, the Act remains in force
in other jurisdictions.' In fact, the majority of district courts and
the three circuit courts that have addressed the constitutionality of
the CSRA have utilized strong arguments to hold that the CSRA
is within Congressional power.24 Part II of this Comment will
provide the background of the federal government's involvement
19. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
20. "The Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and within the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
21. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367. The district court also held that the CSRA violated
the Tenth Amendment and the principles of federalism and comity. See Section V, infra.
22. United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Unites States v. Bailey,
902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995). It must be noted that, prior to publication of .this
Comment, the decision in Parker was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997). The circuit court held that the CSRA
was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment and adopted the
reasoning articulated in Hampshire, 95 F.3d 787, Mussari, 95 F.3d 999, and Sage, 92 F.3d 101.
In addition the court stated that:
Our Job ... is not to second-guess the legislative judgement of Congress
that [the regulated activity] substantially affects interstate commerce, but rather
to ensure that Congress had a rational basis for that conclusion.
... We also adopted a broad definition of commerce, rejecting the notion that the
Supreme Court in Lopez created a bright line rule establishing that unless an
activity is commercial or economic it is beyond the reach of Congress under the
Commerce Clause.
Parker, 108 F.3d at 30 (citing United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 577 (3d Cir. 1995).
23. Michael J. Sniffen, Clinton Enters Fray to Save 'Deadbeat' Law, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Aug. 29, 1995, at A18; Administration Acts to Save Deadbeat Parent Law, LEGAL INTELL,
Aug. 29, 1995, at 4.
24. Twelve courts have held the CSRA to be constitutional: Hampshire, 892 F. Supp.
1327, affd, 95 F.3d 999; Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787; Sage 906 F. Supp. 84, affd, 92 F.3d 101;
Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093; Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302; Collins,
921 F. Supp. 1028; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 1996 WL 397457; Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817;
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389; Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614.
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in child support enforcement, particularly the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's
reasoning in United States v. Lopez which purports to limit
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Part IV
examines the arguments for and against the constitutionality of the
CSRA. Finally, Part V discusses the balance between state and
federal authority in the area of family law, including the importance
of child support enforcement with regard to whether the Act is
constitutional.
II. Background Of The Federal Government's Involvement In
Child Support
The area of domestic relations traditionally has been subject
to the laws of the states alone, not to the laws of the United
States. 5 The federal government's function concerning family law
was limited to determining when states exceeded their authority in
regulating the family, checking on the states' regulation of
interstate families, and attempting to harmonize state laws.26
Beginning in the 1970s, family law became a national concern; thus
changing the traditional role of the federal government.27
Nonpayment of child support strains already dysfunctional
families, drains public resources, and burdens taxpayers."M An
increase in the number of nonpayment of child support cases
caused frustration with state systems because of their inefficient
enforcement.29 One large obstacle the states struggled with was
the growing problem of interstate enforcement of support orders."0
25. The Supreme Court has held that when a court of competent jurisdiction orders
divorce or alimony, a federal court of equity may enforce such decrees. Barber v. Barber,
62 U.S. 582, 591 (1859). However, "[w]e disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts
of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony." Id. at
584. Barber has become the basis of the domestic relations exception which limits federal
jurisdiction in the area of family law. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992).
See also, In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
26. Robert G. Spector, The Nationalization of Family Law: An Introduction to the
Manual for the Coming Age, 27 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2 (1993).
27. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1788 (1995); See
also Spector, supra note 26, at 2.
28. ELAINE M. FROMM ET AL., CHILD SUPPORT. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 1 (1993).
29. H.R. RES. 113, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REC. H7324, H7325-26 (1992); see
H.R. REP. NO. 771, supra note 14; see generally, Margaret Haynes, Child Support and the
Courts in the Year 2000, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 693 (1994).
30. States' abilities to enforce child support obligations outside of their boundaries are
limited by extradition mechanisms. "As a result, skipping out on child support is one of the
19961
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Obligors crossing state lines, to avoid the financial responsibility of
their children, contributed to the states' interstate enforcement
problems.3
The public's awareness of the increasing amount of child
support nonpayment and the public's exasperation with state
enforcement mechanisms sparked the federal government into
action.32 In response to the states' predicaments, Congress passed
several laws to address child support enforcement.3 3  The laws
ranged from providing welfare benefits for children in need to
reforming and unifying state programs3 For instance, in 1975
Congress passed Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to remedy
the increase in the nonpayment of child support by attempting to
reduce the federal welfare budget.35 The IV-D program provides
child support services such as parentage establishment, the location
of absent parents, establishment and enforcement of support, and
modification of support.36
Several laws were also promulgated to reform state child
support enforcement systems, including: (1) the Child Support
Enforcement Amendment of 1984; (2) the Family Support Act of
1988; (3) the Uniform Enforcement of Support Act (URESA); and
(4) the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).37
URESA established a system of reciprocity between states,
38
thereby attempting to create a uniform system to enforce support
orders from other states. Although all states have adopted some
easiest crimes to get away with in America today." 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at
H7325. See H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
31. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7326; FROMM, supra note 28, at 2.
32. Andree Brooks, Child Support: A Growing Problem of Nonpayment, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1982, 91-B10.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Spector, supra note 26, at 1; see generally, H.R. REP. NO. 771, supra note 14.
36. Haynes, supra note 29, at 693. Title IV-D also created a federal Office of Child
Support Enforcement and required states to establish child support offices. Id.
37. Id.; Spector, supra note 26, at 1-2; H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
38. Tina M. Fielding, Note, The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act: The New
URESA, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1994). "The basic mechanism of URESA is
the two-state lawsuit in which the enforcement official files a petition with the enforcement
agency or court in another State. Where the URESA provisions between the two States are
compatible, the law can be used to... enforce a support order." U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, HANDBOOK OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 25 (1989) (hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CHILD SUPPORT). Since
each State has its own URESA laws, the variations in these laws contribute to the difficulty
in enforcing interstate child support enforcement. Haynes, supra note 27, at 714.
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form of URESA,39 UIFSA was designed to improve upon, and
eventually replace, URESA 4 by establishing a support order that
would be enforceable in all states.41 However, interstate enforce-
ment and extradition remain "tedious, cumbersome and slow
method[s] of collection" of child support.42
To combat the problems of interstate enforcement and
extradition, Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act in
1992,4" which imposes criminal penalties on anyone who will-
fully" fails to pay a past-due child support obligation45 with
respect to a child who resides in another state.46 Upon conviction
under the CSRA, the delinquent parent must pay restitution in the
amount equal to the past due support obligation at the time of
sentencing.47 For the first offense, the obligor may be fined,
imprisoned for up to six months, or both.48 Thereafter, the
punishment may consist of a fine, imprisonment for up to two
39. See HANDBOOK OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 38, at 25; Haynes, supra note 29,
at 714.
40. See Spector, supra note 26, at 2. See generally Haynes, supra note 29, at 715;
Fielding, supra note 38, at 447.
41. Spector, supra note 26, at 2. UIFSA has not been adopted by all states yet.
Fielding, supra note 38, at 447.
42. H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 228; see Statement on the Signing the Child Support Recovery Act of
1992,28 PuB. PAPERS 2122 (Oct. 25, 1992) (signing the CSRA into law on October 25, 1992
by President George Bush because five billion dollars in child support goes unpaid every
year and the "deliberate failure of a parent to comply with legally imposed child support
obligations" causes children to suffer).
44. "Willfulness" is the knowing and intentional violation of a known legal duty.
Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, Prospective Guidelines and Procedures
for the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, to United States Attorneys 1 (July 13, 1993)
(citing Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610 (1991) (available from the Office of
Attorney General) (hereinafter Reno Memorandum). The Government must prove that, at
the time the payment was due, the obligor possessed sufficient funds to pay support or that
the lack of sufficient funds was created by the voluntary and intentional act without
justification in light of all the obligor's financial circumstances. Id.
45. A "past due support obligation" is any amount
(A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process
pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person for the support and
maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living;
and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period of longer than one year, or is greater
than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(1).
46. Id § 228(a).
47. Id. § 228(c).
48. Id. § 228(b)(1).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
years, or both.49 The Act appropriated ten million dollars to
states for the establishment of interstate child support enforcement
and legislation." The act also established the Commission on
Child and Family Welfare.5'
By imposing criminal sanctions for the nonpayment of child
support, the CSRA attempts to take the incentive out of fleeing a
state to avoid paying child support. 2 The CSRA was designed to
curb the growing problem of interstate enforcement of child
support53 by the jurisdictional difficulties of enforcing an out of
state order.5 4 The federal government coordinates its efforts with
state agencies."
To accomplish limited federal involvement, an individual in
need of support must completely exhaust the state system's
remedies before federal prosecutors will become involved in a
particular case. 6  The United States Attorneys should require a
referral package which contains the elements of the CSRA offense
and sufficient information to demonstrate that all reasonable
enforcement mechanisms have been exhausted.57 The CSRA
elements which the government must prove are the following: (1)
the obligor had the ability to pay, (2) the obligor willfully failed to
pay, (3) the obligor knew of the past-due child support obligation,
(4) the past-due support is for a child who resides within a different
state from the obligor, and (5) the support obligation has remained
49. Id. § 228(b)(2).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq. (1994).
51. The duties of the Commission consist of: (1) gathering information on issues
affecting children, including abuse, family relations, and family courts; (2) compiling a report
listing strengths and weaknesses of the child welfare system and recommending changes to
the system or developing a federal role in the system; (3) studying the strengths and
weaknesses of the juvenile and family courts; and (4) collecting data about domestic relations
issues concerning the placement and treatment of children. 42 U.S.C. § 12301 (1994).
52. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7326; H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
53. H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
54. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7325.
55. For instance, the FBI and Lucas County, Ohio have formed an alliance to prosecute
parents who violate the CSRA. FBI to Find Support Shirkers: Lucas County Will Track
Parents Who Move from State, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 7,1993, at BS. Another example
is an agreement between the Department of Social Services and the United States attorney's
offices which allows Michigan authorities to enlist the assistance of the FBI and other federal
law enforcement authorities to track delinquent parents who leave the state to avoid paying
child support. FBI to Aid Tracking of Deadbeat Parents, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 21, 1994.
56. S. Res. 2342, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); 140 CONG. REC. S9379, S9426 (1994);
Reno Memorandum, supra note 44, at 4.
57. Reno Memorandum, supra note 44, at 1.
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unpaid for longer than one year or is greater than five thousand
dollars.58  After screening the referral package, the federal
government may take an appropriate case to enforce the past-due
child support obligation. 9
The CSRA provides safeguards and guidelines to ensure that
federal involvement is limited. Despite these safeguards, the
constitutionality of the CSRA has been challenged based upon
United States v. Lopez.' °
III. The Beginning Of The End Of Federal Involvement In
Child Support Enforcement: United States v. Lopez
The United States Constitution created a federal government
of enumerated powers.61 One of the powers is found within the
Commerce Clause.62 Under the commerce power, Congress can
regulate "commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations. '
In Gibbons v. Ogden,' the Supreme Court defined the nature
of the commerce power for the first time. "Commerce, undoubt-
edly is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. ',65  The commerce power can be
utilized to its utmost extent and is limited only by specific prohi-
bitions found in the Constitution.6
After Gibbons, the Supreme Court began to develop the scope
of the commerce power. The Court at first held that Congress
could regulate any activity that had a "direct" effect on interstate
58. Id.
59. Priority is given to cases where one of the following situations exists: (1) a pattern
of flight from state-to-state to avoid payment or flight after service of process for contempt;
(2) a pattern of deception to avoid payment; (3) the failure to make support payments after
being held in contempt; or (4) the failure to make child support payments is linlked to other
potential federal charges, such as bankruptcy fraud. Id. at 4-5.
60. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
61. Id. at 1626.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-90 (1824). See generally Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626-
29 (detailing the history of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
64. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
65. Id. at 189-90; see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
66. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196; see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
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commerce.67 If an activity impacted interstate commerce indi-
rectly, Congress lacked the power to regulate.' However, the di-
rect/indirect test to determine appropriate Congressional regulation
was abandoned within two years.69
One basis for defining the scope of the commerce power is
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,7° which commenced a line of
cases that greatly expanded Congressional commerce authority.
Congress now may regulate any activity, although intrastate in
nature, if it has such a "close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that [its] control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions."71  A particular
activity that is entirely local may affect commerce substantially
when taken cumulatively with other similar activities.'
Essentially, Congress can legislate any activity so long as it
affects interstate commerce. Congress has been given broad
authority under the commerce power. The Supreme Court
traditionally permitted the legislature great deference under the
standard of "rationality review."73 However, for the first time in
67. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 523 (1935), the
Supreme Court addressed Congress' power to give local boards the authority to set wage and
hour standards. An employer, Schechter Poultry, required its employees to work longer than
the maximum hour provisions. Id at 527. The Court held that the chickens used in
Schechter's business had left the "stream of interstate commerce when they came to rest at
Schechter's business and the hours worked by his employees had no direct effect on
commerce." Id. at 543 (emphasis added). See also, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-28. Thus, the
wage and hour regulations were struck down as violative of the Commerce Clause. Schechter
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 550.
68. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 550.
69. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1628.
70. 301 U.S. 1.
71. Id. at 37.
72. For example, Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), has been characterized as
"perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. In Wickard, an owner of a small, local farm harvested
an excess of wheat over the maximum provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. The farmer used the excess wheat for home consumption. Id.
The Supreme Court held that home consumption of wheat substantially affected interstate
commerce because all local farms taken together have a significant impact in commerce. Id.
at 127-28. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding a Fair Labor Standards Act provision to be
constitutional that prohibited shipping in interstate commerce goods produced for interstate
commerce by employees whose wages and hours did not conform to the Act). See also
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
73. "[W] here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them,
have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
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sixty years, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Lopez, over-
turned a federal law based on the finding that Congress exceeded
its power under the Commerce Clause.74
A. The Lopez Majority Opinion
The majority of the Supreme Court in Lopez held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.75 The Court summarized the three
broad areas that Congress has authority to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause as follows: (1) channels of interstate commerce;
(2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.76 The Court clarified the
third category by specifying that only activities that substantially
affect commerce may be regulated. 77  If the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was constitutional, it would fall within the third
category.78 However, the Court determined that possessing a fire
arm in a school zone is not an activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.7 9
The Supreme Court's decision was based on three concerns.
First, the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not include a jurisdic-
tional element to ensure a nexus between interstate commerce and
possession of guns near schools.' Second, the Court distinguished
commerce, our investigation is at an end." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)).
74. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624; see David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause, 81-Jul.
A.B.A. J. 46 (1995); Ruling Eases Fear Court Will Curtail Federal Laws, SEATrLE TIMES,
May 2, 1995, at A5.
75. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (The Gun-Free School Zones Act made it a federal
offense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone).
76. Id. at 1629-30.
77. Id. at 1630; see United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
78. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
79. The government argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act substantially affected
interstate commerce because (1) the costs of violent crime, spread throughout the population,
are substantial; (2) violent crime reduces the incentive for persons to travel within the
country; and (3) guns in schools pose a substantial threat to education which could affect
adversely the nation's economy. fd. at 1632. This reasoning was rejected by the majority.
Id. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert Congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id at 1634.
See Section V, infra (discussing the balance of power between the federal and state
governments).
80. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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between economic and non-economic activities,"1 and found that
the activity being regulated was not economic. Absolutely no
relation to a commercial activity existed that would substantially
affect interstate commerce, since the Gun-Free School Zone Act
was criminal in nature.8 2 Third, Congress failed to provide factual
findings prior to the Act's passage explaining why Congress
believed that gun possession near schools substantially affected
interstate commerce.8' Although formal Congressional findings
are not required, such findings assist courts in determining if the
regulated activity substantially affects commerce, especially where
the effect on interstate commerce is not clear.s4
B. The Lopez Minority Opinions
Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred in the Lopez
decision. Justice Kennedy called the majority opinion a "necessary
though limited holding. 85 Justice Thomas' concurrence denoun-
ced the Court's past departure "from the original understanding"
of the Commerce Clause and emphasized the need for a "coherent
test" for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 6 Justices Stevens,
Souter and Breyer wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice
Breyer argued that the Constitution requires the Court to judge the
effect of an activity on interstate commerce "not directly, but at
one remove."
87
Since the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce and since the legislature is more qualified to
make empirical judgments than the judiciary, the Court must
substantially defer to Congress. 88  Therefore, Justice Breyer
argued that the proper question for the Court is not whether the
activity at issue in the legislation in fact substantially affects
81. Id. at 1630.
82. Id. at 1630-31.
83. Id. at 1631-32.
84. Id. at 1631.
85. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence
focused on the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act upset the balance between federal
and state power. Id. See generally, Charles J. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act: Legislative Over-reaching or Judicial Nit-picking?, 99 ED.
L. REP. 11, 19 (1995).
86. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1628 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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interstate commerce, but rather whether Congress reasonably could
have believed that an interstate connection existed. 9
Justice Breyer also noted that the majority's holding is
inconsistent with prior cases that upheld statutes, even though in
those cases a connection to interstate commerce was less obvious
than the effect of guns near schools at issue in Lopez.' He also
argued that the distinction between "economic" and "non-eco-
nomic" activities is similar to the arbitrary line-drawing between
direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce that was rejected
by the Supreme Court more than fifty years ago.9 Finally, Justice
Breyer expressed concern that the majority's decision will create
"legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed
reasonably well settled.
9 2
C. The Future of Lopez
What effect Lopez will have remains to be seen. As one
commentator framed the issue, "[t]he potential impact of Lopez is
intriguing because it may mark either a major change in consti-
tutional law or only the boundary of the outer limits of congres-
sional power." 93 Yet more than a year after Lopez was decided,
federal courts continue to accord Congress a substantial degree of
deference.94 Many district courts are still upholding federal laws
even after the Lopez decision.95
89. Justice Breyer concluded that Congress reasonably could have believed that "guns
in schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms....
Education, although far more than a matter of economics, has long been inextricably
intertwined with the Nation's economy." Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting); See also id at
1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Il at 1662. Some activities in which the Supreme Court upheld Congressional
power to regulate have included: (1) criminalizing loan sharking at a local level (citing Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)); (2) prohibiting racial discrimination at local
restaurants (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)); and (3) applying the
Agricultural Adjustment Act to the consumption of home-grown wheat by a local farmer
(citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). Id. at 1662-63. "The local instances [by the
Gun-Free School Zones Act] taken together and considered as a whole, create a problem
that causes serious human and social harm, but also has nationally significant economic
dimensions." Id. at 1663.
91. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663; see also id. at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Stewart, supra note 74, at 48.
94. For instance, even with the limited topic of the CSRA, the circuit courts and the
majority of the district courts have upheld the Act's constitutionality.
95. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 999
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995); United States
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The Supreme Court itself has not radically altered its approach
to Commerce Clause issues since Lopez which has led some
commentators to predict that not many federal laws will be
curtailed.96 Similarly, the Third Circuit concluded that "despite
protestations to the contrary, the winds have not shifted that
much."97  In fact, even under the stricter Lopez analysis, the
CSRA should be upheld as a valid exercise of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.
IV. United States v. Lopez-Applied To The CSRA
Both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer's dissent in
Lopez suggested that the regulation of "marriage, divorce, and
child custody" was beyond the constitutional authority of the
federal government.9" Not surprisingly, lower federal courts have
differed in holding whether the CSRA should be upheld as
constitutional after Lopez. The District Courts in Arizona,
Pennsylvania, and Texas applied a Lopez analysis and held that the
CSRA is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congressional
commerce power.99 On the other hand, three circuit courts, as
well as the majority of district courts, have held that the non-
v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), aff'd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.
1995). See generally Guns in Schools: A Federal Role?": Hearings on S. 890 Before the
Subcomm. On Youth Violence of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General) (commenting that
three months after Lopez, twelve challenges to the constitutionality of federal acts on
Commerce Clause grounds were made, but failed).
96. Stewart, supra note 74, at 46; Ruling, supra note 67, at A5; see, United States v.
Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (May 1, 1995) (holding the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) to be constitutional because the business in question was involved
in interstate activities).
97. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590.
98. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (stating that if the Gun-Free School Zones Act
substantially affected interstate commerce, it would seem that "Congress could regulate any
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family
law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."); id at 1661 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see Dailey, supra note 27, at 1789.
99. United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v.
Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding the CSRA
to be unconstitutional primarily because the Act violates the principles of federalism and
comity).
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payment of child support substantially affects interstate commerce
and that the CSRA is therefore constitutional.' °
Despite the Supreme Court's dicta regarding the federal
government's involvement in domestic relations issues and some
lower court holdings that the Act is unconstitutional, the CSRA
passes the Lopez test. Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
CSRA appears to fall within the third category of congressional
Commerce Clause power. 1 ' However, several courts have found
that the CSRA falls within the first category in Lopez-the Act
regulates the channels of interstate commerce.' 2
A. Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
In order to be valid under the third Lopez category of
Congressional commerce power, the CSRA must regulate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. Applying the three
concerns raised by the Lopez majority to the CSRA shows that the
Act regulates an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. Therefore, the Act should be deemed constitutional.
1. Jurisdictional element of the CSRA.-The first Lopez
requirement is the existence of a jurisdictional nexus of the
regulated activity to interstate commerce. l33 Unlike the Gun-Free
School Zones Act in Lopez, "the CSRA does not require a
reviewing court to 'pile inference upon inference' in order to
100. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995), affd 95 F.3d 999
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787; United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp.
84 (D. Conn. 1995), affd 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp.
1093 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United
States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp.
1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Va. 1996); United
States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817, (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233
(M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States
v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995).
101. "[C]riminalizing the failure to pay child support would not qualify as the regulation
of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor would it qualify as the regulation of
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce." Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 363-64. But see,
infra Section IV.B. (discussing recent cases applying the "channels of interstate commerce"
category to the CSRA); See also Sage, 92 F.3d at 107 (holding the CSRA constitutional based
on the last Lopez category, the power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of, or
persons or things in, interstate commerce.
102. Sage, 92 F.3d at 107; Lewis, 935 F. Supp. at 1097; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 313-15;
Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 913; Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237; Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842. See
infra section IV.B.
103. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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establish an interstate nexus. The nexus is direct, concrete, and
express."'°4
The CSRA explicitly requires that the child and the non-
custodial parent live in different states,05 guaranteeing a nexus to
interstate commerce."° A further connection is enforced by the
requirement that the delinquent parent be outside of the state's
immediate control, and that the funds at issue must be transferred
from one state to another °7
Despite the explicit requirements contained in the CSRA, the
Arizona District Court held that the Act does not contain a
jurisdictional element to establish the requisite interstate nexus.'O
The court considered the requirement that the delinquent parent
and the child live in different states insufficient to ensure a
connection with interstate commerce' °9 and held that an actual
and substantial effect on interstate commerce must also be shown
by Congress. °
The Arizona District Court also stated that "[t]he nexus of
requiring the non-paying parent and the child to live in different
states goes beyond those cases the CSRA was aimed to address,
namely parents who flee a state in an attempt to avoid child
support payment.""' However, this argument overlooks the fact
that, through the CSRA, Congress intended not only to prevent the
flight of delinquent parents, but also to penalize all out-of-state
parents who intentionally fail to pay child support obligations.1
2
Regardless of whether the child or the parent moved out-of-state,
the result is the same: an interstate nexus is established because
two states are involved. As the Ninth Circuit stated, "[i]t doesn't
matter whether the interstate character of the transaction is created
104. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 313 (citation omitted).
105. "[W]hoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child
who resides in another State shall be punished." 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
See Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at
392.
106. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91.
107. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
108. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 364-65.
109. Id. at 365.
110. Id. at 367.
111. Id. at 365.
112. H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14.
[Vol. 101:2
19961 ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT AFTER LOPEZ 433
by the parent or the child. What matters is that an obligation...
comes to wear an interstate face.
113
It is uncertain whether the existence of a jurisdictional element
alone makes a federal law a constitutional exercise of the com-
merce power."' One district court specifically stated that limiting
the CSRA to interstate activity by providing a jurisdictional nexus
does not necessarily establish the validity of the Act because the
nonpayment of child support must also substantially affect
interstate commerce."1 The District Court of Rhode Island also
stated that the jurisdictional nexus does not render a law per se
constitutional," 6 Therefore, the CSRA must be analyzed under
the remaining Lopez concerns to determine whether the non-
payment of child support substantially affects interstate commerce.
2. Economic v. noneconomic activity.-The second concern
raised in the Lopez opinion is that the regulated activity must arise
out of, or be connected to, a commercial transaction.1 7 The
Lopez distinction between "economic" and "noneconomic"
prohibits Congress from regulating noneconomic intrastate
activity."8 Therefore, for the CSRA to be held constitutional, the
nonpayment of child support must be economic in nature.
Commerce exists when there is "a continuous and indivisible
stream of intercourse among the states involving the transmission
of large sums of money and communications by mail, telephone
and telegraph."'1 9 The Lopez Court also considered commerce
to include "any sort of economic enterprise," and stood ready to
uphold Congress's authority to regulate activities that "arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction."'" Paying child
support may not be a traditional item of interstate commerce, but
113. Schroeder, 95 F.3d at 790-91.
114. A jurisdictional nexus may be an exception to the Lopez distinction between an
economic and non-economic activity. However, allowing Congress to avoid the eco-
nomic/non-economic distinction simply by supplying a jurisdictional element would seem to
give Congress unlimited authority under the Commerce Clause. See Dailey, supra note 27,
at 1817 n.99. See generally, Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367 (requiring a substantial effect on
interstate commerce).
115. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
116. United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D.R.I. 1996).
117. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
118. Dailey, supra note 27, at 1817.
119. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 276
(1955)).
120. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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it can surely be considered an economic activity.12' Child support
money that passes across state borders constitutes a "continuous
and indivisible stream" of money; therefore, the stream of child
support payments commencing when one parent crosses a state's
lines should constitute "commerce.""' Furthermore, since the
obligation to support a child is a debt, and a debt is an economic
activity,"2 the CSRA regulates economic activity.
But despite the acknowledgement that the obligation of child
support is a debt, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that child support payments are not a com-
mercial activity or an economic enterprise. 24 The court reasoned
that arm's length commercial actors are not involved in the
transaction, the marketplace for goods and services and prices of
commodities are not affected, a citizen's ability to travel is not
threatened, and a willful failure to pay child support involves no
other crimes."2 Although the court acknowledged that failure to
pay child support does have some links with interstate com-
merce," it considered those links to be minimal, and not "the
sort of economic enterprise that substantially affects interstate com-
merce."
127
However, it is difficult to fathom how interstate ties are
"minimal" when one looks at the tremendous effect that non-
payment of child support has on the national economy. If a
particular activity substantially affects the national economy, the
activity is classified as economic. " Therefore, the economic
121. A regulated activity does not necessarily have to be a commercial activity in order
to be economic in character. United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 89 (D. Conn. 1995),
affd 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393.
122. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89.
123. United States v. Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hampshire,
95 F.3d 999, 1003-04 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Va.
1996).
124. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 834, 835.
125. Id. at 835.
126. Id. at 834-35. Ties to interstate commerce include: (1) making out-of-state telephone
contacts; (2) utilizing the mails; (3) traveling across state lines; (4) making transfers across
state lines; and (5) paying with currency, the common denominator of all commercial
transactions. Id.
127. I&
128. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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impact of shirking child support obligations renders the non-
payment of child support an economic or commercial activity.129
"The effects of [the] ... nonpayment of child support.., on
the national economy are widely documented."" The non-
custodial parent's avoidance of a child support obligation exacer-
bates child poverty and requires the government to spend its own
resources to provide for financially abandoned children.'
Throughout the 1980s, the poverty rate among families with an
absent parent steadily increased.'32 Also, when child support is
not paid, the absent parent benefits financially while the child
suffers exorbitant financial loss. 3 The result is a depletion of
assets that affects both custodial parents and children." The
decrease in assets impacts interstate commerce by shifting economic
resources and business transactions. 35 Thus, nonpayment of child
support is a "multi-billion dollar annual national problem.""
Such a vast problem "necessarily impacts the flow of goods and
services in a national economy.'
137
In addition to the contention that child support has no
economic impact, another argument that the CSRA does not
129. See Hampshire, 95 F.2d at 1004; United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1082
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that "the activity itself need not be economic or commercial in
nature, but its impact must be"); Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 914 ("Without payment of such child
support, many custodial parents and their children often cannot obtain adequate housing,
food, clothing, medical care, and other goods and services. This leads to poverty,
homelessness, poor health, and a burden on the federal treasury.").
130. Dailey, supra note 27, at 1819. In 1991, $11.9 billion was collected, only 67% of the
$17.7 billion due to children. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD
SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS 9 (1991). Moreover, 34% of
noncustodial parents live either in different states from their children, overseas, or at an
unknown residence. Id. at 6.
131. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330; see generally Fromm, supra note 28, at 1 (Children
are not only financially abandoned by the noncustodial parent that fails to pay child support,
but also secondarily abandoned by the custodial parent that must work long hours away from
home to provide for the family's basic needs.).
132. In 1989, 3.2 million single-parent families were below the official government
poverty level. H.R. REP. NO. 771, supra note 14, at 5.
133. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90 (As of 1992, $48 billion in child support payments was owed
nationally, but $35 billion remained uncollected); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093,
1098-1100 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302,310 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
also 140 CONG. REC. S9429, supra note 56.
134. See Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90; cf. United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 284-85 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that the robbery of an individual affects interstate commerce because the
individual's assets are depleted).
135. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90.
136. United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028,1036 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
137. Id.
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regulate an economic activity is the Act's criminal nature. Since
the CSRA is a criminal statute, the Act is analogous to the Gun-
Free School Zones Act in Lopez. In Lopez, the Supreme Court
held that the criminal statute had "nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise.', 38  The Arizona District
Court in United States v. Schroeder139 similarly concluded that the
CSRA has no effect on interstate commerce because it provides
criminal sanctions for nonpayment of child support.' 4°
Although the CSRA is a criminal law, the activity that the Act
regulates has a direct and significant impact on the national
economy. Moreover, the child support statute is comparable to
other criminal statutes that federal courts have determined concern
economic activity. 141 For instance, Congress has the power to
criminalize certain interstate travel, such as federal sanctions for an
individual that "flee[s] a state to avoid prosecution or a legal
compulsion to testify."' 42 Escaping from a state to avoid the law
is analogous to fleeing a state to avoid payment of child support.
Since the laws regarding flight from a state are constitutional, the
CSRA should also be found to regulate an economic activity, and
so be considered a constitutional exercise of Congressional power.
In Schroeder, the district court also found that no "commercial
intercourse" is involved in the enforcement of child support
obligations since the nonpayment of child support does not affect
federal money sufficiently to give Congress the power to legis-
late. 3  Federal money is not impacted because civil legislation
was implemented by Congress conditioning the grant of federal
money upon the passage of state child support enforcement
legislation.'" Since the civil legislation is effective, 45 a criminal
138. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
139. 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
140. Id. at 364.
141. See United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995).
142. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (federal prohibition of flight to avoid prosecution or giving
testimony); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (federal prohibition of kidnapping where an abductee
is transported across state lines); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1993);
Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937); United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65
(W.D. Ky. 1936).
143. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367. The district court found that the grant of federal
money to states to establish child support legislation under the CSRA is constitutional
because these provisions are not actually part of the text of the CSRA, but rather are found
at 42 U.S.C. § 3796cc. Id. at 366 n.7.
144. Id. at 366.
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statute is not necessary to enforce nonpayment of support. In
addition, extradition exists between states to punish delinquent
parents for failing to pay child support; therefore a federal criminal
statute is not warranted.146 However, considering the millions of
dollars in child support that is still uncollected, criminal sanctions
for delinquent parents who shirk their child support responsibilities
is justified even though civil legislation and extradition are utilized.
The nonpayment of child support is an economic activity.
Moreover, interstate commerce is impacted substantially by
nonpayment of support. At the very least, Congress rationally
could have believed that the failure to pay child support would
significantly affect commerce. However, even though the CSRA
concerns an economic activity that has a substantial affect on
interstate commerce, Congressional findings further support the
validity of the Child Support Recovery Act.
3. Congressional findings.-The third concern of the Lopez
Court was the lack of Congressional findings prior to the passage
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act.147 Legislative history and
factual findings determine Congress' intent when passing a law
pursuant to the commerce power.' 4 An abundance of Congres-
sional factual findings exist in the CSRA's legislative history to
support the constitutionality of the Act.149
145. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program has increased the collection
of child support by 328 percent between 1976 and 1988. Id
146. See id at 366. Most states have passed URESA and numerous states also have their
own criminal statutes concerning child support. Id. at 364. But see H.R. REP. No. 771, supra
note 14 ("[I]nterstate extradition and enforcement in fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and
slow method of collection.").
147. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
148. See United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D.R.I. 1996) ("The existence
of explicit legislative findings of a nexus between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce can establish the constitutionality of a statute even without jurisdictional
elements.").
149. Some factual findings include the following. (1) "[t]en million women head
households with children whose father is absent from the home." H.R. REP. No. 771, supra
note 14, at 4-5. Sixteen million children live in these homes. Id. at 5. (2) In 1989, "$16.3
billion in child support payments were [sic] due, but only $11.2 billion [of the payments
actually] were [sic] made." Id. (3) The average $5 billion annual deficit increases enrollment
in the child welfare program Aid to Families with Dependent Children and burdens
taxpayers. Id. (4) With interstate collection cases, enforcement of child support orders is
particularly difficult. Id. "[A]pproximately one-third of child support cases concern children
whose father[s] live in [I different state[s]." Id. "Fifty-seven percent of custodial parents in
interstate cases receiving child support payments only occasionally, seldom, or never." Id
Chances to successfully avoid making child support payments increase dramatically when a
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:2
For instance, Congress based the CSRA upon the recognition
that millions of dollars are owed to children whose noncustodial
parent lives out-of-state."s Additionally, interstate cases are the
most difficult to enforce.' Therefore, the CSRA was passed
only to enforce interstate cases in which the non-custodial parent
flagrantly refuses to pay child support.
Even though there were numerous statistics which created a
nexus to interstate commerce, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that such findings were insuf-
ficient.' The district court recognized that such statistics "paint
an unsettling portrait of a growing national problem,"'' but then
stated that "the mere fact that an activity involves billions of
dollars, without more, is insufficient to show a substantial relation-
ship between the activity and interstate commerce."''
Similarly, in finding the CSRA unconstitutional, the district
court in Schroeder merely concluded that no specific legislative
history existed to support the determination that the CSRA is
aimed at interstate commerce.55 The Arizona District Court also
found that the legislative history demonstrated that the purpose of
the CSRA was to "impose a criminal penalty for flight to avoid
parent flees to another state. Id. (5) 42 States have made the willful failure to pay child
support a crime. Id. at 6. Ability to enforce such laws outside a state's jurisdiction is limited.
Id. Extradition and enforcement are tedious and slow methods of collection. Id. For cases
citing other specific Congressional findings, see United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 103-04
(2d Cir. 1996); Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1098-99; United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United
States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp.
84, 90-91 (D. Conn. 1995).
150. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1098.
151. "'Too often as soon as delinquent [parents] move to new States, they seem to vanish
as far as State enforcement agencies are concerned' because the State 'mechanisms lose their
effectiveness."' Sage, 92 F.3d at 104 (quoting 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7324,
H7326 (statement of Rep. Hyde)). "'[T]he ability of those states to enforce such laws outside
their own boundaries is hobbled by a labyrinth of extradition laws and snarls of red tape."'
Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 10908-99 (quoting 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7325
(statement of Rep. Schumer)).
152. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 836-37.
153. Id. at 836.
154. Id. at 837. The court essentially reasoned that using dollar figures put "the cart
before the horse" because, although the monetary amounts establish a substantial
relationship to commerce, it is first necessary to decide whether the activity affects
commerce. Id.
155. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367.
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payment of arrearages. '' 5 6 Since the CSRA does not contain an
intent to flee requirement, the Act is not tailored specifically to
combating fleeing parents.
1 57
However, Congress indicated that the purpose of the CSRA
was not only to punish those delinquent parents who flee from the
state to avoid child support obligations but also to punish "certain
persons who intentionally fail to pay their child support obli-
gations."'58 The latter purpose encompasses the fleeing parents
as well as the situation where the custodial parent moves out of
state. The "'innocent' relocation to a different jurisdiction is no
less an injurious use of ... interstate commerce than the intentional
flight to avoid payment of child support obligations where it is
accompanied by the non-payment of support obligations."'59
With regard to legislative history, the differences between the
viewpoints of the majority and the dissent in Lopez must be
considered. The majority of the Supreme Court in Lopez deter-
mined whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act actually substan-
tially affected interstate commerce.' 6 The dissenting opinions of
Justices Souter and Breyer analyzed the facts to see if Congress
reasonably could have believed, based on its findings, that the
regulated activity substantially affected commerce. 161  The dis-
senting Justices' viewpoint comports with sixty years of deference
given to Congressional fact-finding power.162  This deference
means that it is not for the court "to address the wisdom or folly
of Congress in adopting the CSRA,"'' but only to determine
whether Congress rationally could have believed, based on its
factual findings, that the nonpayment of child support substantially
would affect interstate commerce. The numerous factual findings
in the CSRA's legislative history leads to the conclusion that not
156. Id. at 365 (emphasis in the original); see also, Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 836 n.9
(remarking that the floor debate from the CSRA reveals that the Act's sponsors may have
misunderstood its scope because at least four legislators stated that the Act was to crim-
inalize fleeing to another state to avoid payment of a child support obligation).
157. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 365.
158. H.R. REP. No. 771, supra note 14, at 4.
159. United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v.
Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
160. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-33.
161. Id. at 1653-54, 1658-62.
162. See id. at 1654.
163. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan. 1995); see generally
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3d Cir. 1995).
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only could Congress reasonably have believed that interstate
commerce is significantly affected by the nonpayment of child
support, but also that interstate commerce is actually substantially
impacted. The majority's opinion in Lopez may have opened the
door to even more federal legislation despite the Supreme Court's
attempt to restrict Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.1" A different result might have been reached in Lopez
if factual findings had existed prior to the statute's passage. 165 If
legislative history supports Congress' intent behind passing a law
that will affect interstate commerce pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, such as the history of the CSRA, courts may give deference
to such Congressional findings. Although the future effects of
Lopez remain to be seen, what is certain is that the holding is a
dramatic statement toward federalism and the limitation of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
B. Channels of Interstate Commerce
Another area that Congress has the right to regulate under
Lopez are activities which affect channels of interstate com-
merce.166  Recently, several district courts have based their
decisions on whether the CSRA is constitutional under this
category.167
"[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from immoral or injurious uses has been frequently
sustained, and is no longer open to question."1" The payment,
or nonpayment, of child support obligations involves the use of
channels of interstate commerce in two ways: (1) money is
164. Russo, supra note 85, at 22.
165. Congress made factual findings after the constitutional attack on the Gun-Free
School Zones Act in an effort to save the law, but this did not matter to the Court. Stewart,
supra note 74, at 48. However, perhaps a substantive difference exists when congress makes
factual findings prior to the passage of a law and records them in the legislative history, such
as it did with the CSRA.
166. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Supreme Court meant "channels" to mean "the
interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods move." United States v.
Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
167. United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1097-98 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v.
Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 313-15 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233,
1237 (M.D. Fla. 1966). Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842-43. Note that when applying this
category, no "substantially affects" element is necessary and the activity need not be
commercial in nature. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 313.
168. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 313 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)); see also Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1097; Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237.
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transferred across state lines and (2) either the delinquent parent
or the child moves to a different state.169 For several reasons, the
use of interstate travel to avoid child support payments is a
compelling reason for Congress to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce by enacting the CSRA. 7°
First, the CSRA is "predicated on the court order requiring
child support payment across state lines, which payment must
necessarily occur by interstate channels."'71 Congress essentially
is regulating a debt obligation owing in one state paid to persons
in another state. 72 This payment of debt involves interstate
channels.t7'
Second, the obligor may have traveled by interstate commerce,
thereby enjoying the benefit of avoiding child support obliga-
tions." However, the detriment caused by using interstate
channels also can occur where the custodial parent and child move
out-of-state. 75 Thus, persons, as well as money, flow through the
channels of interstate commerce.
Finally, the use of channels to avoid child support payments
brings about "an immoral and injurious result."' 76  Delinquent
parents "shamelessly manipulate a foundation of our system of
government-State sovereignty-in order to avoid paying child
support.""7  Further, by not paying child support, the parents
threaten an essential "foundation of society, the family."'78
Therefore, Congress could criminalize the nonpayment of child
support based upon the "channels" category of Lopez.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
rejected the argument that the CSRA regulates channels of
169. Argued by the United States but rejected by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842-43.
170. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237.
171. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 314.
172. Id.; see supra text accompanying footnotes 123 through 126.
173. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237.
174. Id
175. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315 (stating that it is "equally detrimental" where the
noncustodial parent "seize[s] on the custodial parent and child's relocation out-of-state as an
occasion to stop payments.").
176. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237.
177. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 314-15.
178. Id. at 315. See id. at 313 and United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 842 n.15
(E.D. Pa. 1995), for examples of other injurious and immoral uses of channels of interstate
commerce.
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interstate commerce.179 The court stated that the Act "does not
regulate the movement of goods or persons in interstate com-
merce. ' 1 ° First, the court reasoned that unpaid money is not a
good and the crime charged against a delinquent parent is not
transferring money across state lines."' Therefore, no items ever
travel in interstate commerce. Second, in some cases, the obligor
is never involved in interstate commerce because it is the custodial
parent that moves. Thus, the Act does not regulate "persons".8
However, the Parker court's analysis of channels is extremely
narrow. Commerce involves not only tangible goods, but also
intangibles such as debts or child support payments.1 83 In addi-
tion, persons need not be only an obligor moving through interstate
commerce, but can include the relocating custodial parent and child
as well. Finally, the flagrant use of interstate commerce to avoid
child support payments is a detriment that affects the family-
financially and emotionally-and the balance between federal and
state power.
V. Federalism And The Enforcement Of Child Support
Although not a specific element in the Lopez Court's analysis,
the Supreme Court was extremely concerned with the balance
between state and federal powers."s Under the line of cases that
seemed to expand the Commerce Clause without any limita-
tion, 18 it seemed that Congress could regulate almost anything
under the commerce power. However, the scope of the interstate
commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of govern-
ment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government.'8
179. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830.
180. Id. at 842.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 843.
183. See United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1996); see generally supra text
accompanying footnotes 119 through 126.
184. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
185. See supra text accompanying footnotes 64-74.
186. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
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"When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction."' 1  Hence, the
constitutionality of the CSRA depends on its effect on the balance
between state and federal powers.
To determine whether the CSRA infringes upon state
authority, the principles of federalism188 and comity'89 must be
analyzed with regard to the Act. In addition, the CSRA has been
challenged under the Tenth Amendment."9 Further, two addi-
tional factors also should be considered: (1) whether state
jurisdiction is inadequate to solve a problem that the federal
government is in a position to assist the state due to its prose-
cutorial resources and (2) whether the problem is one of national
concern.
191
A. The Principles of Federalism and Comity
Although criminal law and family law are normally state
concerns, under the CSRA the federal government interferes only
after a state's resources are completely exhausted. The CSRA is
"not an attempt to 'federalize' enforcement ... but an attempt to
step in where the unique capabilities of the Federal Government
can come to the aid of state and local agencies."" 9  The Act does
not usurp state power, but rather, supplements the states' efforts to
enforce child support.
Several courts have held that the principles of federalism and
comity are not harmed by the CSRA 93 Lopez cannot be read
187. Id at 1631 n.3 (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973),
quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
188. Federalism is defined as the "interrelationships among the states and relationship
between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed.
1990).
189. "Comity" is a "proper respect for state functions." United States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp. 727, 728 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
190. See United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 394 (D. Ariz. 1995).
191. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization
Debate, 46 HAsTINGs L.J. 967, 972 (1995).
192. Mary Jo White, Collecting Child Support is a Federal Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1995, at A15. See also United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that the CSRA responds to deficiencies in states' enforcement of child support
orders where they are handicapped when parents subject to the orders are not physically
present in their boundaries).
193. United States v. Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis,
936 F. Supp. 1093, 1101-03 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076,
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to suggest that all legislation concerning family law is invalid. 94
Congress, in passing the CSRA, determined in a nonarbitrary
manner that the willful nonpayment of child support has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.19 Furthermore, the
principle of federalism has never been grounds to declare a
Congressional act unconstitutional. 96
Nonetheless, the district courts in United States v.
Schroeder19" and United States v. Bailey198 held that the CSRA
violates the principles of federalism and comity. Under these
principles, the federal government may not interfere with tradi-
tional state functions such as family law and criminal law.' 99
Further, the district courts argued that federal courts would violate
the principles of federalism and comity by making a determination
and review of state court support orders." These arguments
against the CSRA's constitutionality based on federalism and
comity principles are grounded in the "domestic relations"
exception by which federal courts traditionally have abstained from
exercising authority over domestic relations matters."°
1083 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315-16; United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp.
1028, 1034 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389,393 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995).
194. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330. "[T]he mere presence of state regulations
regarding the same activity subjected to federal regulation is not enough to frustrate or
invalidate Congressional will." Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315.
195. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
196. "[T]his court finds no case where those 'principles' [of federalism and comity] were
held to be grounds to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional." Hopper, 899 F. Supp.
at 393. See also United States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
197. 894 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Ariz. 1995).
198. 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
199. ld. at 729; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367.
200. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 368; Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 729; United States v. Lewis,
936 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that the CSRA allows relitigation of the
merits of the state support order, but such review does not violate the Tenth Amendment).
But see United States v. Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that although
comity may require a federal court to "stay its hand" until the state court interprets its
support order, such possibility does not make the CSRA unconstitutional); United States v.
Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that the CSRA merely enforces
state court decrees and does not attempt to legislate the amount of child support in any
particular case); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302,317 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that
the CSRA could not "require a federal court to go behind the support order itself").
201. United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859)).
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While the domestic relations exception' bars federal courts
from addressing matters concerning marriage, divorce and child
custody, the exception is inapplicable in determining whether the
CSRA is constitutional for several reasons. First, the exception is
a narrow rule of statutory construction' which is invoked only
when a divorce, alimony, or custody action is brought in a federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction.' The domestic relations
exception has no application where the CSRA explicitly grants
jurisdictional authority.2' The CSRA gives federal courts the
express grant of federal question jurisdiction.' Second, the
domestic relations exception is not an absolute exception.' The
exception applies only to limit federal courts in issuing a divorce,
alimony, or custody decree.' However, the enforcement of such
decrees, including child support, does not bring the principles of
federalism and comity into issue and so is exempted from the
domestic relations exception.' Finally, the Supreme Court has
held that a child can bring a personal injury action against a parent
in federal court without being within the scope of the domestic
relations exception.210 Allowing a child to recover past-due child
support is comparable to a child being allowed to sue a parent for
personal injuries.2" A child also should be permitted to recover
a past-due child support obligation, at least where the obligation is
a court judgment, without being hampered by the domestic
relations exception.2"
Since the domestic relations exception is not a bar to the
CSRA's constitutionality, the principles of federalism and comity
202. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
694 (1992).
203. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 700; United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330
(D. Kan. 1995).
204. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704; Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1106; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at
316; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
205. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 316-17.
206. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330-31.
207. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 317.
208. United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v.
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 394 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
209. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1106 ("The mere fact that the present case is related to a
child support award is not sufficient to warrant the use of the domestic relations exception");
Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 317; Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1235; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 394.
210. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. 706; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 394.
211. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 394.
212. Id.
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are not violated. Further, the challenges to the CSRA on Tenth
Amendment grounds must also fail.
B. The Tenth Amendment and the CSRA
The Tenth Amendment provides that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." '213 The Schroeder court held that the CSRA violates the
Tenth Amendment because Congress exceeded its congressional
powers.214 Since Congress did not act within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, the federal government infringed upon powers
specifically reserved to the states, namely family and criminal
law.215  However, Congress can criminalize conduct forbidden by
states without violating the Tenth Amendment.
2 16
In determining the existence of a Tenth Amendment violation,
the relevant inquiry is whether a federal law was enacted pursuant
to Congress' constitutional authority.217 If so, the statute does not
violate the Tenth Amendment.218  Because the CSRA was en-
acted pursuant to an enumerated power-the commerce pow-
er-the Tenth Amendment is not a basis on which to find the
CSRA unconstitutional.
219
Another reason that the CSRA does not violate the Tenth
Amendment is that the Act does not attempt to regulate the
conduct of states as states or to usurp states' powers.' The Act
merely regulates private conduct and does not intrude into the
wholly intrastate family.221  The CSRA complements states'
213. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
214. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 368.
215. Id.
216. United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v.
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 92
(D. Conn. 1995). See generally United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1101-03 (D.R.I.
1996) (analyzing thoroughly the Tenth Amendment issue).
217. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1236; United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 315
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The inquiry is not whether the states primarily regulate a particular
activity. ld.
218. Kegel, 915 F. Supp. at 1236.
219. United States v. Schroeder, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996); Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1236.
220. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 913; Sims, 936 F. Supp. at
820; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
221. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 913; United States v. Sims, 936
F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Okla. 1996); Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
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enforcement of child support orders in interstate cases.m The
Tenth Amendment cannot be held to "disable the United States
from helping the States to enforce State court orders imposing
obligations to make support payments interstate. ' ' m
In addition to the CSRA complying with the Tenth
Amendment and the principles of federalism and comity, the
federal government's ability to enforce interstate cases and the
importance of child support payments as a national concern support
the constitutionality of the CSRA.
C. The Importance of Child Support-A National Concern
Which the Federal Government is Equipped to Solve
The CSRA is limited to interstate child support cases where
states have failed to prosecute a deadbeat parent because of
jurisdictional difficulties.224 The federal government is uniquely
situated to handle the more difficult, interstate cases. By upholding
the CSRA as a valid exercise of Congressional authority, "federal
intervention will be available where it is needed."'
Although states have more experience and have been more
efficient than the federal government with criminal and domestic
relations issues in the past,' the federal government is now
armed with new Department of Justice guidelines'm to ensure
increased efficiency in the enforcement of interstate cases.m
Thus, states are assisted when their child support workloads
222. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 315; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 913.
223. United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996).
224. Gorelick & Litman, supra note 191, at 971.
225. Id. at 972.
226. Some statistics showing states' efficiency and effectiveness include: (1) States have
more current information concerning domestic relations cases. (2) The federal government's
delivery of payment may not be as prompt. (3) The federal government should concentrate
on making state systems more uniform instead of federalizing the law. (4) Federal
government's work is inefficient as demonstrated by the sixty percent of cases that are
"currently uncollectible." (5) Custodial parents are passed back and forth between federal
and state agencies, and Department of Justice guidelines have had little practical effect.
Haynes, supra note 29, at 693, 696-97.
227. Reno Memorandum, supra note 44.
228. In December 1994, 28 cases were filed in which the courts ordered overdue
payments of one million dollars to be collected from parents in thirteen states. Two hundred
cases remain under active review. Reno Gets Credit for Putting Heat on Deadbeat Parents,
DAL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 29, 1994, at A12. In 1995, 75 cases were filed, 500 cases were
investigated, and twenty parents were convicted. Sniffen, supra note 23, at A18; Admin-
istration Acts, supra note 23, at 4.
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overburden their resources.229 Frequently, once a noncustodial
parent moves to a different state, local enforcement agencies
cannot keep track of that parent efficiently.3' The federal
government can assume the responsibility for the interstate case
and enforce the child support obligation effectively. Also, the
CSRA provides funds to help states establish agencies and to
enforce child support obligations."
More importantly, the CSRA assists states by sending the
message that the federal and state governments are getting tough
with deadbeat, delinquent parents.3 2  In essence, the CSRA
dissuades parents from fleeing the state to avoid paying child
support and persuades them to take responsibility for their
children.3
The CSRA is a "rational response by Congress to a national
problem that the federal government alone is equipped to han-
dle."'  Nonpayment of child support hurts the entire nation,
morally and economically.35  When a matter is federalized, a
message is sent to the public that the issue is important and of
national concern.36  With the federal government involved, the
problem of nonpayment of child support is highlighted.
The CSRA is one of several federal remedies that is an
enforcement tool to collect past-due child support obligations.
237
The Act is designed to protect children from financial abandon-
ment by the noncustodial parent, and puts the responsibility of
children on the shoulders of parents rather than taxpayers. The
229. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7325-26.
230. Id. at H7326.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 3796cc-379cc-6 (1994).
232. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 29, at H7327.
233. Sniffen, supra note 23, at A18; Administration Acts, supra note 23, at 4. See also,
WILLIAM J. BROCKELBANK ET AL., INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT, 17
(2d ed. 1971) (The criminal enforcement provision of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act was included even though no collection can be made if an obligor is jailed.
Jailing offenders is not a practical solution to actually collecting support, but at least the
threat of extradition is a powerful weapon in the case of "shiftless and slippery obligors.").
234. United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 93 (D. Conn. 1995).
235. White, supra note 192, at A15.
236. William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,
734 (1995). But see, Dailey, supra note 27, at 1820 (commenting that an assumption that the
presence of a strong national interest warrants federal involvement is mistaken).
237. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT BROCHURE, THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT OF 1992.
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CSRA acts as a reinforcement to frustrated custodial parents that
effective remedies do exist to solve their financial problems.
VI. Conclusion
The CSRA's future remains uncertain after the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Lopez. However, when Lopez
is applied to the CSRA, the Act passes constitutional scrutiny.
First, the Act has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. The
CSRA is different from the Gun-Free School Zones Act challenged
in Lopez in several respects: (1) the CSRA contains a juris-
dictional element that connects interstate commerce and the non-
payment of child support; (2) non-payment of child support has a
significant impact on the national economy and therefore, child
support is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce; and (3) a profusion of Congressional findings were
made prior to the passage of the Act. Furthermore, the Act
lawfully regulates channels of interstate commerce. Thus, Congress
can regulate the nonpayment of child support under the CSRA
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
In addition to the CSRA satisfying the Lopez test regarding
the commerce power, the CSRA complies with principles of
federalism and comity and the Tenth Amendment. The CSRA
supplements state legislation in the area of interstate enforcement
of child support-an area that the federal government uniquely is
situated to handle.
The CSRA deals only with egregious support offenders.
Essentially, the "question is whether to reach these offenders
through 'federalization' of child support violations combined with
a highly selective enforcement policy, or not to reach them at
all." 8 In light of the limited involvement of the federal govern-
ment in imposing criminal sanctions for nonpayment of child
support, the CSRA should be held to be constitutional. Otherwise,
innocent children will be the ones that suffer and "[t]he only
freedom that would be enhanced by striking down the Act would
be the freedom of [delinquent parents] to evade their State
obligations to support their children residing in different State. '239
By upholding the CSRA, "deadbeat" parents, such as Mr. Nichols,
238. Gorelick & Litman, supra note 191, at 974.
239. United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996).
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will no longer be able to ignore the law. Instead, they will be
brought to justice and forced to pay.
Nicole M. Raymond
